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Decision-makingSocial valuation of ecosystem services and public policy alternatives is one of the greatest challenges facing eco-
logical economists today. Frameworks for valuing nature increasingly include shared/social values as a distinct
category of values. However, the nature of shared/social values, as well as their relationship to other values,
has not yet been clearly established and empirical evidence about the importance of shared/social values for val-
uation of ecosystem services is lacking. To help address these theoretical and empirical limitations, this paper
outlines a framework of shared/social values across five dimensions: value concept, provider, intention, scale,
and elicitation process. Along these dimensions we identify seven main, non-mutually exclusive types of shared
values: transcendental, cultural/societal, communal, group, deliberated and other-regarding values, and value to
society. Using a case study of a recent controversial policy on forest ownership in England, we conceptualise the
dynamic interplay between shared/social and individual values. Theway inwhich social value is assessed in neo-
classical economics is discussed and critiqued, followed by consideration of the relation between shared/social
values and Total Economic Value, and a review of deliberative and non-monetary methods for assessing
shared/social values. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of shared/social values for decision-
making.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).arine Science, Oban PA37 1QA,
).
. This is an open access article under1. Introduction
Social valuation of ecosystem services and public policy alternatives
is one of the greatest challenges facing ecological and environmental
economics today (Parks and Gowdy, 2013). If we are to achieve such
valuation, theoretical and methodological plurality is needed tothe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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services to human wellbeing (Bebbington et al., 2007; TEEB, 2010;
Wegner and Pascual, 2011; UK National Ecosystem Assessment [UK
NEA], 2011, 2014; Parks and Gowdy, 2013). Yet conventional economic
approaches to valuation, including the valuation of non-market benefits
of the environment, and the welfare economic theory on which these
are based, tend to approach value as one-dimensional, and (ultimately)
held by individuals alone. Value to society is thus typically considered
through aggregation of individual valuations, with the assumption
that these valuations reflect underlying preferences and values
(Klamer, 2003). However, such an approach may not capture collective
meanings and significance ascribed to natural environments, potentially
missing important, shared dimensions of value. Choices about the envi-
ronment are fundamentally ethical and social, because the preferences
we hold as individuals are influenced by socialisationwithin a particular
society, but also because of the environmental impacts that individual
behaviour has on others. As Vatn (2009, p. 2210) states: “Through the
physical linkages existing in nature, a social interconnectedness is
forced upon us. In this context one may ask whether individual prefer-
ences are the best basis for social choice.”
Deliberative and participatory approaches to environmental val-
uation and appraisal are increasingly advocated as a way to include
the multidimensionality of value within decision-making. While
such approaches have considerable advantages, there remains de-
bate about whether they should augment, complement, or replace
cost–benefit as the principal tool for welfare assessment (O'Neill,
1996; Price, 2000; Holland, 2002b; Bebbington et al., 2007; Wegner
and Pascual, 2011; Parks and Gowdy, 2013). In relation to resource
management, notions of communal values and ‘collective intention-
ality’ also give rise to the need to fulfil communal obligations in par-
allel with strategies to maximise individual welfare (Ishihara and
Pascual, 2012). Recent frameworks for ecosystem valuation, such as
those developed by the UK NEA (2011, 2014), The Economics of the
Environment and Biodiversity (TEEB, 2010) and the Common Inter-
national Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES; Haines-Young
and Potschin, 2012), include ‘shared’, ‘social’ or ‘shared social’ values
as a distinguishable value category. There is also governmental inter-
est in analytical methods and quantitative measures for social and
shared values for nature (Fish et al., 2011a, 2011b; Fujiwara and
Campbell, 2011; Maxwell et al., 2011). However, in the literature
these terms refer to a wide range of overlapping concepts and the
theoretical basis for such concepts and their inter-relationships is
weak. Gaining clarity about shared and social values is essential for
decision-makers to better manage conflicts over natural resources,
assess the social impacts of policy and develop effective environ-
mental management strategies (White et al., 2009; Fish et al.,
2011b; Kenter et al., 2014; UK NEA, 2011, 2014).
Contemplating shared and social values inevitably leads to questions
about the relationship between broad, ethical values (in the sense of
guiding principles), contextual or attitudinal values (in the sense of
worth or importance), and value in the sense of a monetary measure.
Further questions relate to how preferences are shaped, whether
there is an identifiable category of values that are shared socially and
not obtained by the aggregation of individual monetary valuations,
whether or when such values should be elicited, and when it is suffi-
cient to aggregate individual monetary valuations to obtain a collective
sense of significance. This then leads to questions about whether or
when shared values can be sufficiently accounted for by adapting and
improving neoclassical economic valuation methods (such as contin-
gent valuation and cost–benefit analysis) or whether new or additional
approaches are needed to obtain the full contribution that ecosystems
make to human wellbeing. This paper will explore these questions
through a consideration of how shared and social values can be
conceptualised. In so doing, the paper seeks to clarify themain terms as-
sociatedwith these values, provide definitions and examinehow shared
values might be assessed.This paper focuses primarily on environmental valuation. Valuation is
therefore distinguished from valuing. We consider the latter as an infor-
mal, largely implicit process not bound to any particular setting, while
the former relates to formal research, analysis or decision-making pro-
cesses where values (of various types) are explicitly expressed (e.g., in
surveys or workshops) or deduced (e.g., through content analysis of
media). The purpose of valuation, as discussed here, is to provide knowl-
edge about the value of ecosystems and their services as a contribution to
environmental decision-making, monitoring and management process-
es. While there have been decades of valuation evidence produced
with the explicit aim of helping policy-makers take better account of en-
vironmental benefits and costswhenmaking decisions, this evidence has
largely failed to translate into tangible improvements in terms of envi-
ronmental outcomes (Jordan and Russel, 2014; Turnpenny et al., 2014).
The issue is therefore not just one of knowledge gaps, but also of knowl-
edge acquisition and utilisation. Some consider that environmental valu-
ation and appraisal on the basis of aggregated individual values has
reached the limits of welfare economics, and that amore social approach
to valuation has the potential to provide a more convincing and legiti-
mate evidence base (Farber et al., 2002; Parks and Gowdy, 2013), or
form a complementary assessment providing a more comprehensive
suite of evidence overall (Sagoff, 1998; Bebbington et al., 2007;
Fujiwara and Campbell, 2011).While we focus here on shared and social
values in the context of the environment, concerns around the need for
their inclusion, and the limits of conventional welfare economics in this
respect, are also increasingly recognised in other fields, such as valuation
of health services (e.g., Cleary et al., 2011;Mooney et al., 2002). Given the
importance of shared and social values for making decisions, this paper
will thus have wide relevance to academics and practitioners across dif-
ferent valuation fields.
The paper first discusses how the terms ‘shared’, ‘social’ and ‘shared
social’ values have been used in the literature. It then establishes a the-
oretical framework that outlines five dimensions for distinguishing dif-
ferent interpretations of shared and social values: value type, provider,
the process used to elicit values, the intention of value and the scale.
Along these dimensions, seven main categories of shared and social
values are identified (Table 1). How shared values relate to individual
values is then considered using a case study on forest ownership in En-
gland. This is followed by a discussion and critique of neoclassical ap-
proaches to economic environmental valuation and the relation
between shared and social values and Total Economic Value (TEV). A
range of monetary and non-monetary methods for assessing such
values are reviewed. Finally, we discuss the relevance of shared and so-
cial values for decision-making in different spheres, and future research
avenues are identified.
2. Conceptions of shared and social values
Within the fields of ecosystem assessment and environmental valu-
ation, ‘shared values’, ‘social values’, and ‘shared social values’ have
encompassed a wide diversity of meaning. This section provides some
examples of how these different terms have been conceptualised in
the literature. The aim here is to highlight the breadth of interpretations
rather than to provide a fully comprehensive review or conclusive
definition.
2.1. Shared values
The term ‘shared values’ has often been used to refer to guiding prin-
ciples and normative values that are shared by groups or communities
or to refer to cultural values more generally. Daily et al. (2009) argued
that the shared values of ecosystems refer to underlying cultural values
that might help shape the institutions necessary to make the ecosystem
services framework operational. In an examination of policy analysis
and aggregation of values, Sagoff (1986) discussed shared values as syn-
onymouswithwhat he also called ‘public values’: “goals or intentions the
Table 1
Main types of shared and social values with definitions and dimensions along which they can be discriminated.
Type of
shared/social
values
Definition Associated
dimension
Transcendental values Conceptions about desirable end states or behaviours that transcend specific situations and guide selection or evaluation of
behaviour and events (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987)
Concept
Cultural and societal values Culturally shared principles and virtues as well as a shared sense of what is worthwhile and meaningful. Cultural values are
grounded in the cultural heritage and practices of a society and pervasively reside within societal institutions (Frey, 1994).
Societal values are the cultural values of a society; societies may be more or less homogenous, so there may be multiple sets of
cultural values in one society that overlap to a greater or lesser degree with each other
Provider
Communal values Values held in common by members of community (e.g., geographic, faith/belief-based, community of practice or interest),
including shared principles and virtues as well as a shared sense of what is worthwhile and meaningful
Provider
Group values (within valuation) Values expressed by a group as a whole (e.g., through consensus or majority vote, or more informally), in some kind of
valuation setting
Provider
Deliberated values Value outcomes of a deliberative process; typically, but not necessarily, a deliberative group process that involves discussion
and learning
Process
Other-regarding values As contextual values: the sense of importance attached to the well-being of others (human or non-human). As transcendental
values: regard for the moral standing of others
Intention
Value to society Benefit, worth or importance to society as a whole Scale
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they are his because he believes and argues they should be ours; he pursues
them not as an individual but as one of us” (p. 302). For example, many
people consider that wild places should be preserved even when it
has no benefit to them, or to others; they believe in this goal because
it aligns with their idea of the shared values of a good society. A further
characteristic of the shared nature of values described by Sagoff is that
they are ‘impersonal’, and hence deliberative and political processes
are required to adequately identify them. Thus, the conception of shared
values as implicit, communal or public values, and of shared values as
values that are brought forward through deliberative social processes
appear to be closely related.
Shared values may also refer to values held in common by groups in
particular contexts. For example, Stein et al., (1999) investigated both
contrasting and shared values around landscape management in the
Upper Midwest of the United States that were held in common by
urban and rural groups of stakeholders. By understanding what values
were shared within groups and communities as well as what values
were shared between groups, landmanagers were better able to identi-
fy mutual goals and improve cooperative planning processes and
outcomes.
2.2. Social values
The term ‘social values’ has also been used in diverse ways. It can
refer to the values of a particular community or the cultural values
and norms of society at large, but can also be used to refer to the public
interest, values for public goods, ‘altruistic’ values and feigned altruistic
values, the values that people hold in social situations, contribution to
welfare or well-being, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of a group, the ag-
gregatedWTP of individuals, or values derived through a social process.
For example, Kennedy et al. (1995) discussed social values about natural
resources as, on the one hand, values deriving from the ‘social system’
and, on the other, as the wider norms expressed through laws, political
action,media and other institutions. As such, the authors suggested two
layers of social values: a culturalfirst layer that influences a second layer
of contextual values in relation to natural resource management.
Sherrouse et al. (2011) and Brown (2013) discussed social values in
a participatory GIS (Geographical Information Systems) context. In
these papers social values were constructed as equivalent to ‘landscape
values’, which were conceived as non-monetary place-based values
categorised by type, e.g., spiritual, aesthetic and subsistence, and
contrasted to (economic) monetary valuations. For Bryan et al. (2010)
the social values terminology was used to refer to any kind of use or
non-use benefits that people derive from ecosystems. This is in contrastto ‘ecological values’, which these authors characterised as a score based
on multiple ecological attributes regardless of human benefits. Aggre-
gate ‘social values’ – again assessed using a GIS approach – were then
constituted as a non-monetary rating of value to society.
2.3. Shared social values
The amalgam ‘shared social values’ has been used to refer to subsets
or combinations of the various concepts described above. For example,
Norton and Steinemann (2001) used the term ‘social’ to refer to a soci-
etal context while ‘shared social’was used to indicate group deliberated
values reflecting that societal context. In a discussion of community-
based environmental management using multi-criteria approaches, so-
cial values were related to aspirations: values that reflected hopes and
dreams of the public. Social values would drive individuals to pick
criteria and indicators and, through a deliberative process sets of shared
social values and appropriate indicators for these values were then
identified. In a more theoretical discussion, Stagl (2004) also referred
to shared social values in the context of multi-criteria evaluation, and
its relation to deliberative decision-making, complexity and post-
normality (see e.g., Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Shared social values
were regarded as the outcome of processes of effective social interac-
tion, open dialogue and social learning. From this perspective, shared
social valueswere closely allied to sharedmeanings, and effective policy
for a society depends on the creation of these among cultural groups, as
they do not exist a priori. Stagl regarded the formation of shared mean-
ing and values as a social learning process, where, in the words of
Webler et al. (1995), “…individuals [learn] how to solve their shared prob-
lems in amanner that is responsible to both factual correctness and norma-
tive consent” (p. 445). In contrast, Reed et al. (2010) considered social
learning as “a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual
to become situated within wider social units or communities of practice
through social interactions between actors within social networks” (p. on-
line). The relationship between individual values and values of wider
social units will be discussed in Section 4.
This brief overview illustrates that while the terms shared and social
are often used interchangeably, there is a different and distinct empha-
sis: ‘shared’ more generally refers to those holding or providing the
value, whereas ‘social’ tends to qualify the type of value. ‘Shared’ sug-
gests a type of cultural value, common principle, or, more generally,
the values held in common by a group, community or society. The ‘so-
cial’ adjective often refers to a social scale, a social intention or a social
process. Thus, the term ‘shared social values’ is not necessarily tautolog-
ical, as social values in relation to others or society can be expressed
either on an individual basis or through a shared social process.
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As illustrated, usage of the terms ‘shared’ and ‘social’ is diverse and
ambiguous. Rather than reducing this plurality to single definitions,
we instead identify five dimensions to help bring clarity to the way in
which the terms are described andmay be used for the purpose of iden-
tification, elicitation and measurement. These dimensions are as fol-
lows: the concept of values, the value provider, the elicitation process,
the intention of value, and its scale (Fig. 1). These dimensions allow dif-
ferentiation between the ways in which the terms have been used
(Table O1) and to evaluate social issues and processes in terms of clearly
identified types of shared and social values. The following subsections
explain each of these dimensions.
3.1. The concept of values (‘value concept’)
We make a distinction between three primary concepts of values:
transcendental values, contextual values, and value-indicators. Transcen-
dental values are guiding principles that transcend specific situations
and can be seen as the “criteria that people use to select and justify actions
and to evaluate people (including the self) and events” (Schwartz, 1992,
p. 1). Contextual values are values in the sense of opinions about
worth or importance, which are dependent on an object of value and
hence contextual and attitudinal. Value-indicators are a measure of
the importance of something, expressed in monetary terms (e.g., social
willingness-to-pay) or non-monetary terms (e.g., the frequency of oc-
currence of a coded term in an interview transcript). Although some
of these distinctions are commonly made (Dietz et al., 2005), they are
not often clearly articulated or do not articulate all three concepts
(e.g., Ives and Kendal, 2014). Differentiation of values on this axis
bears resemblance to the differentiation of values into ‘held’ andElicitation process
Deliberated values
Non-deliberated values
di
V
TrValue provider
Societal & cultural 
values
Communal 
values
Individual 
values
Group 
values
Fig. 1. Shared and social values framework: the five dimensions and sevenmain types of shared
ing from the dimensions, we can differentiate between types of values that might be termed sh
vider is a dimension that indicates who might provide values in a valuation setting; societies,
values, which are all types of shared or social values. Individuals also provide values, but the
other than that of value-provider. Arrows within boxes indicate directions of influence betw
value provider strongly influence what value types are articulated along the concept, intention‘assigned’ by Rokeach (1973). Here, held things are the things that we
hold as important while assigned values are the values that we assign
to things. However, that distinction is problematic, because it is unclear
into what category opinions about the worth of something fall.
Transcendental values are often associatedwith ethics andnormative
beliefs, which are shared culturally. Because of this, it is these values that
are sometimes characterised as shared, social or cultural values. This
stands in contrast to contextual values that are more allied with individ-
ual attitudes and preferences (Table 2). In sociology, transcendental
values are considered as learned, epistemologically grounded, relatively
enduring, emotionally charged and representing moral conceptualiza-
tions that assist us in making judgements and in preparing us to act
(Frey, 1994). As illustrated by Table 2, in addition to these ethical princi-
ples, transcendental values include things that can be characterised as
desirable end states, such as ‘a varied life’, ‘family security’, or ‘mature
love’ (Schwartz and Jerusalem, 1994; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and
Bilsky, 1987). Rokeach (1973) subdivided transcendental values into in-
strumental values, in the sense of principles/virtues, and terminal values,
in the sense of end-states. However, this distinction is not particularly
helpful, because if principles are seen as virtues, by definition they are
in themselves also terminal. Finally, transcendental values are not neces-
sarily made explicit (Frey, 1994) and in relation to the environment are
often latent (Niemeyer, 2004).
Contextual values are considered to be closely associated with, but
different from, preferences and attitudes (Table 2). While contextual
values reflect an opinion of worth, preferences are a stated or revealed
ranking or rating. The difference between a contextual value and an at-
titude is that a contextual value expresses an opinion ofworth, while an
attitude is an opinion of favour. For example, onemay value the conser-
vation of a certain bird species (a contextual value), favour policies that
help to achieve conservation of the species (an attitude) and preferValue intention
Other-
regarding
values
Self-regarding
values
Value
mensions
Value scale
Value to 
society
Value to 
individual
alue concept
anscendental
values
Contextual
values
Value
Indicators
and social values. Bold titles indicate non-mutually exclusive dimensions of value. Emerg-
ared, social, or shared social values (italicised) and other types of values. For example, pro-
cultures, communities and ad-hoc groups provide societal, cultural, communal and group
se are not termed shared or social, unless they can be classified as such on a dimension
een different types of values. Grey arrows signify that the type of elicitation process and
and scale dimensions.
Table 2
Schwartz values. An overview of key transcendental values identified by Schwartz
(Schwartz and Jerusalem, 1994; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). Schwartz ar-
gues for a ‘universal’ structure in values across cultures, which consists of a range of di-
mensions (italics) across four main axes.
Self-transcendence Self-enhancement Openness Tradition
Universalism Power Self-direction Tradition
Protecting the
environment
Social power Creativity Devout
A world of beauty Authority Curious Respect for
tradition
Unity with nature Wealth Freedom Humble
Broad-minded Preserving my public
image
Choosing own
goals
Moderate
Social justice Social recognition Independent Accepting portion
in life
Wisdom Detachment
Equality Achievement Stimulation
A world at peace Successful Daring Conformity
Inner harmony Capable A varied life Politeness
Ambitious An exciting life Honouring parents
and elders
Benevolence Influential Obedient
Helpful Intelligent Hedonism Self-discipline
Honest Self-respect Pleasure
Forgiving Enjoying life Security
Loyal Clean
Responsible National security
True-friendship Social order
A spiritual life Family security
Mature love Sense of belonging
Meaning in life Reciprocation of
favours
Healthy
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al values may be influenced by information and beliefs, but also by
norms, needs, traits and roles Table 2.
Value-indicators are expressions of value in commonly understood
units. The most obvious examples are amounts of money, ratings,
rankings and indices. Value-indicators can be used to assess the trade-
offs that people are prepared to make. While ontologically value-
indicators are not of themselves values, they are here included as a
value concept, as in practice they are generally referred to as values.
As an example of the interrelations between these different concepts
in the context of valuation of ecosystem services, consider a proposal to
restore wetlands to improve water quality. Water purification can be
viewed as a service, improved health as a benefit and one's perception
of the importance of this as a contextual value. Contextual valueswill de-
pend on beliefs such as those about the state of current water quality,
but also beliefs about others' beliefs and norms. If one then considers
something ought to happen (a norm), onemight then have a favourable
attitude towards restoration of wetlands. If one is then asked for a view
on a proposal to raise taxes so that the wetland can be restored, one
might then have a preference for this to happen over maintaining the
status quo. The strength of this preference could be expressed as the
amount one is willing to pay, a value-indicator. Overall, contextual
values, attitudes and preferences could be positively influenced by
health as an overarching transcendental value, but also by other tran-
scendental values such as family security and harmony with nature.
3.2. Whose values are being considered (‘value provider’)
A second dimension found in the literature concerns who provides
the values under consideration. Four types of providers of value can be
distinguished: societies as whole, communities, ad-hoc groups, and in-
dividuals. Societies as a whole share cultural and societal values, which
may be considered shared principles and virtues as well as a shared
sense of what is worthwhile and meaningful. There may, of course, be
multiple sets of cultural values within a society, but for simplicity herewe use the terms cultural and societal values interchangeably. Cultural
values are grounded in the cultural heritage of a society and pervasively
residewithin societal institutions (Frey, 1994). These include both tran-
scendental and contextual values. For example, it is said that British
culture values politeness (transcendental), and has a culture of tea-
drinking (contextual). Cultural values are expressed through arts,
media, political processes, and institutions, and are also reflected in
the values of individuals. More detail on the relation between societal
and individual values is discussed in Section 4.
Of course, societies are not homogenous, and within them there is a
wide range of social groups that express distinct communal values, in-
cluding local communities, faith groups and communities of practice
and interest (e.g., and groups of people that share a profession or an ac-
tivity such as recreational users of the environment). In addition, there
are ad-hoc groups associated with research, such as a discussion group
of stakeholders or a focus group with members of the public, which
can come to collectively value outcomes that we term group values;
for example, in techniques such as citizens' juries,multi-criteria analysis
or participatorymapping. The difference between communal and group
value providers is relevant, because for communal values the focus of
valuation will likely be on shared experiences, practice and institutions,
while for group values the focus is on process (e.g., coming to consen-
sus). Communal and group values can overlap, for example when com-
munal values arise in a deliberative valuation workshop.
We purposively refer here to value providers rather than value
holders, as the aim of our discussion is to develop a useful typology in re-
lation to valuation of nature (as opposed to the broader andmore infor-
mal valuing of nature). By focusing on provision of values, we also avoid
the need to come to afinal conclusion onwhether, ultimately, values are
individual or intersubjective and whether it is individuals or social enti-
ties that ‘hold’ shared values. In terms of the provider dimension, we
thus conceive of shared values as values that are expressed collectively.
In terms of non-market valuation of the environment, the usual value
providers are individuals, but with increasing interest in deliberative
approaches to valuation, group value expressions (through consensus
or majority vote) are becoming more common (Fish et al., 2011a;
Spash, 2008; Zografos and Howarth, 2010; Kenter et al., 2011, 2014).
3.3. How values are elicited (‘elicitation process’)
A third important dimension is the elicitation process, which seeks
to distinguish between deliberated and non-deliberated values. The dis-
tinction between group and individual ‘settings’ is generally made in
the deliberative valuation literature (Lo and Spash, 2012; Spash,
2007), but this does not discriminate between the provider and process
dimensions, as valuation may take place in group settings where the
group or workshop setting does not include significant deliberation.
For example, Christie and Rayment (2012), in a large-scale study on
the value of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan, used group settings as a
means to inform participants and to ensure that they were familiar
with complex concepts related to biodiversity. The valuations elicited
from individuals in this type of group settingmay be characterised as in-
formed individual values (or in this case, more specifically, informed indi-
vidual WTP), which is considered different from deliberated individual
values (orWTP), because it is not just the group setting but also the pro-
cess that determines whether a value can really be considered ‘shared’.
Recent research suggests that non-deliberated individual values, delib-
erated individual values and deliberated group values can all be signifi-
cantly different both in monetary and non-monetary approaches, with
deliberated individual values falling between non-deliberated individu-
al values and deliberated group values (Kenter et al., 2014).
3.4. Scale of values (‘value scale’)
A further discrimination that needs to bemade is between the individ-
ual scale, and the ‘social’ scale, which has bearing on value to society, or in
1 The population of England in 2013 was approximately 53 million.
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and a varied life for oneself (e.g., reflected in consumer behaviour), but in
relation to society other values such as fairness or responsibility might be
more important (e.g., reflected in voting behaviour). In terms ofmonetary
value-indicators, the social scale can refer to aggregateWTP or social WTP.
For example, if a population of 100,000people has amean individualWTP
of £10 to restore awetland, one possible aggregateWTPwould be £1mil-
lion. However, one might also ask how much the government should
spend on this wetland instead of other social priorities; if an individual
states an amount of £1million, this would constitute a social WTP. To dis-
tinguish here from previous dimensions, if this £1 million were to be de-
termined as a groupdecision, this could be termed group socialWTP. If this
group decisionwas determined through a deliberative process thiswould
be termed deliberated group social WTP.
3.5. Intention of values (‘value intention’)
The dimension of intention relates to whether values are self-
regarding or other-regarding, altruistic values. For example, one may
value one's own life enjoyment (self-regarding), but also that of one's
neighbour or that of future generations (other-regarding). Intention dif-
fers from the scale dimension, as values for others are not necessarily
values in relation to society.
Neoclassical economics explicitly does not concern itself with other-
regarding values, as it could be argued that in so doing, double counting
would occur. Although valuation may consider such things as altruistic,
existence and bequest values within a framework of Total Economic
Value (TEV) (Pearce and Moran, 1994), ultimately it is conceived to be
the personal satisfaction that one gains by being altruistic that is consid-
ered the source of value. The relation between shared and social values
and TEV will be explored in more detail in Section 6.
Relevant to the dimensions of both intention and scale, it has been
posited that people have multiple sets of values and preferences.
These may include a self-regarding set at the individual scale, where
people maximise their personal utility according to their consumer
preferences (‘I want’), and another set of other-regarding ‘citizen’ values
(‘society should’) (Sagoff, 1998). These are underpinned by a broader
set of transcendental values and include non-utilitarian deontological
and virtuousmotives. The implicit nature of these transcendental values
may need to be brought out through a deliberative process (Kenter
et al., 2014; Lo and Spash, 2012; Niemeyer, 2004; Sagoff, 1998). In the
following section the dynamic relation between the values of individ-
uals and shared and social values is considered.
4. Shared and social values and the individual
To more fully understand what shared and social values are, it is
fruitful to clarify how different types of shared values relate to the indi-
vidual. A considerable amount of academic literature has revealed how
individuals adapt transcendental and cultural values through implicit
and explicit socialisation processes (for example, special issue in
Current Sociology, 2011). In sociology the formation of values at both
the cultural and individual level is regarded as a socio-cultural phenom-
enon. This formation refers to “emergent value articulations as they are
being shaped, reproduced or changed by social action” (Bachika and
Schulz, 2011 p. 109). These cultural and societal values are acquired
over time and become embeddedwithin the culture of a particular soci-
ety. There can be catalysts or conflict points (e.g., terror acts and disas-
ters such as Bhopal and Fukushima, or highly-contested political
issues such as fracking, or the debate on forest ownership in the UK —
see below)where a society debates values; these are potentialmoments
of re-valuation or recognition of values that were previously not out-
wardly or explicitly articulated.
Schwartz (1999) identified auniversal set of values that operate at the
cultural/societal level as well as at the individual level. At the societal
level, values “represent the implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideasabout what is good, right and desirable in a society” (Schwartz, 1999
p. 25). Societal values are promoted, imparted, transmitted, changed
and maintained in a variety of ways such as through exposure to formal
and informal customs, laws, norms, cultural traditions and societal insti-
tutions (Bourdieu, 1972; Markus and Kitayama, 1994). At the interface
between the societal and individual levels, one may speak of the opera-
tion of values to refer to the role that value articulations play in life
(Bachika and Schulz, 2011). Individual values are therefore a product of
cultural values but are also interpreted through each person's own indi-
vidual experience.
Schwartz (1999) posited that these collective values can be inferred
by aggregating the values of individuals as they will point to underlying
common values and are a product of shared culture. Others however
argue that deliberation through the public sphere, public debate, and
consultation are needed to articulate shared and social values
(Dobson, 2012). From this perspective, citizen or stakeholder values
should be articulated through constructive dialogue and communica-
tion if these values are to be accounted for as legitimate factors. Through
such a process people listen to arguments and use reasoned judgement
in deliberative fora to come to an agreement or decision, which could
potentially bring about more democratic outcomes than analytical ag-
gregation of individual preferences. Deliberation in the public sphere
and public spaces can thus be considered a key part of political as well
as social theory (Dobson, 2012).
The dynamics between shared and social values and the individual are
highlighted in the example of the attempt to ‘sell off’ the public forests
managed by Forestry Enterprise England (FEE). In 2011 the UK govern-
ment launched a consultation to propose amix of selling (to private com-
panies and community groups) and handing over (to charities) England's
public forest estate (PFE), rather than have a government body (FEE)
manage the forests. Elicitation of values occurred through a number of
routes, including formal public consultation, social and print media and
an Independent Panel on Forestry (IPF). The initial public consultation,
where individuals and organisations were asked to formally submit com-
ments to the government on the proposal, was cancelled after three
weeks due to intense public protest, particularly about ownership and ac-
cess issues. A key concern about the consultation pertained to why the
government was changing the ownership of the PFE without giving peo-
ple the opportunity to statewhether the existing ownership andmanage-
ment was acceptable (Lawrence and Jollands, 2011). After cancelling the
consultation the Secretary of State for the Environment established the
IPF chaired by the Bishop of Liverpool to advise the government on the fu-
ture of England's forests andwoods as awhole, rather than solely focus on
the PFE. The ten visits of the IPF to local communities and stakeholders in
England could be characterised as a deliberative approach to considering
and appraising the future of forestry in England.
While research highlights that many people value trees and wood-
lands, the articulation of this value is not usually prominent in the public
domain in everyday discourse. The most obvious indicator of value is
the 358 million visits made to woodlands in England in 2011 (Natural
England, 2012).1 The protests around the proposed sell-off involved
the articulation and operation of a plurality of values, with value pro-
viders at the individual, communal and societal level. At the individual
provider level half a million people signed an online petition, 7007
commented on the first consultation prior to its cancellation and
42,000 made comments to the IPF consultation request for feedback.
This latter process was based on five open questions about the future
of forestry rather than relying primarily on closed-ended questions as
had been used in initial public consultation (IPF, 2011; Lawrence and
Jollands, 2011). At the communal provider level, direct collective action
was undertaken through protests in local forests; new groups were
formed such as ‘hands off our forests’ and ‘keep our forests public’,
while larger NGOs supported local groups in their protests. At the
Table 3
Glossary of terms relating to values. Terms referring to types of shared and social values are given in Table 1.
Term Definition
Values 1. Transcendental values: conceptions about desirable end states or behaviours that transcend specific situations and guide selection or evaluation of behaviour
and events (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987)
2. Contextual values: opinions about the importance or worth of something
3. Value-indicators: the importance or worth of something expressed in units of another (e.g., monetary values) or as a rank, rating, count or index
Concerns Concerns include values, but also accounts for the perceived risk to what is valued. Consequently, one may value an element of the environment but not be
concerned with it if one does not perceive it to be at risk (Schultz, 2001)
Attitudes Favourable or unfavourable evaluations of an object, person or issue (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). One may value wilderness and be opposed to constructing a dam
in a natural area; the latter is an attitude. The difference between a contextual value and an attitude is that a contextual value expresses an opinion of worth,
while an attitude is an opinion of favour.
Traits An enduring disposition of personality (Hitlin and Pitliavin, 2004)
Norms ‘Ought to’ statements regarding specific situations (Hitlin and Pitliavin, 2004)
Needs Biological demands on an individual (food, shelter, reproduction etc.) (Hitlin and Pitliavin, 2004)
Preferences Rankings or ratings of possible outcomes (Dietz et al., 2005)
Beliefs Any proposition that is accepted as true (Colman, 2001). Whereas an attitude must be evaluative, a belief does not imply value judgement
Worldviews Generalised beliefs about the state of the world (Dietz et al., 2005)
Roles Differing ways of behaviour and decision-making depending on the social situation. Weight of values may differ across roles (Dietz et al., 2005).
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journals, magazines) extensively reported on the issue, but also played
a role in its social amplification by suggesting that access would no lon-
ger be allowed to some woodlands or that some woodlands might be
felled to make way for housing or business. Value elicitation started at
the individual scale via the consultation but oncewider debate and pro-
test started, particularly via the popular media, the issue became more
articulated at the societal scale and many people felt the need to come
together to discuss shared values for woodlands in relation to society.
Individual contextual values were articulated with people often draw-
ing on their own experiences of visiting specific woodlands as a child
and as an adult that were important to them. Communal values were
also articulated, with woodlands being seen as an important aspect of
local communities particularly in areas with strong historical and cul-
tural connections to woods such as the New Forest and the Forest of
Dean (in the south of England). At the societal level the debate covered
benefits at an individual scale, e.g., woodlands are good for children and
families, but also how we should value not only woodland as a society
but nature more broadly, and about justice and who should have access
to land. There were major concerns that the public goods provided by
the PFE such as open access, recreation, and biodiversity might be
degraded or not be available under different ownership. The intention
of these values was clearly other-regarding. The articulation of values
at the communal and societal level was thus not just about the aggrega-
tion of individual values focused on what people wanted from wood-
lands themselves, but came about through debate and dialogue of
transcendental values that covered ethical issues such as who should
have access to and benefit fromwoodlands. Thus, deliberation activated
these transcendental values that were previously implicit, which ulti-
mately led to a re-evaluation of the policies that had been proposed
on assumptions around benefits and cost based on aggregation of indi-
vidual welfare measures.
This case study thus illustrates the complexity of value concepts,
elicitation processes, providers, scale and intention of values. What
started as a clear commitment and rationale for government of shifting
the balance of power from ‘big government’ to ‘big society’ through re-
ducing government ownership and management of public woodland
became an arena of much public debate and disquiet around the pro-
posed privatisation. The dimensions and types of shared and individual
values outlined in Section 3 came into play throughout the consulta-
tions and IFP activity atmultiple levels (individual, community, society),
not in a linear trajectory but iteratively through local action, print and
social media. While different types of shared and social values can be
identified within this process, it is also apparent that these types were
often co-emergent, with transcendental and other-regarding values
and values in relation to society often emerging from deliberation at
the communal and societal provider level.5. Shared and social values and environmental valuation
It is thus an important question whether shared and social values can
be elicited througheliciting the values of individuals, orwhether other ap-
proaches are necessary. To further explore this we briefly examine how
environmental economic valuation considers value to society. Fundamen-
tally, most economic valuation uses social welfare functions to establish
social welfare from a given set of individual preferences or welfare rank-
ings. These values are assumed to be self-regarding only, excluding other-
regarding values. Although environmental economic valuation may con-
sider such things as altruistic, existence and bequest values within a
framework of TEV, as will be discussed in the next Section, ultimately it
is conceived to be the personal satisfaction that one gains by being altru-
istic that is considered the source of value. The assumption of the self-
serving, utility-maximising individual is also a requirement of Bergson–
Samuelson social welfare functions, which are conventionally used to es-
tablish social welfare in Cost–Benefit Analysis (CBA) and allied methods
(Hausman, 1993). If the full value of ecosystems is not incorporated into
economic accounting and decision-making, this is essentially considered
a technical problem, rather than aphilosophical one that requires changes
in how value is conceived (Ravenscroft, 2010).
This individualistic, utilitarian way of establishing social value has
seen considerable critique. Preferences can be uncertain and transient.
Individuals exhibit preferences that, to the observer, do not appear in-
crease these individuals' well-being (for example drug use or self-
harming behaviour), and well-beingmay be derived as much from out-
growingmany of ourwants as from satisfying them (Sagoff, 1986). Indi-
vidual preferences, behaviour and WTP are not just determined by
individual utility but also by other-regarding values and moral norms
(Peacock, 1997; Keat, 1997).
Additionally, when aggregating individual preferences, some kind of
agreement is needed on how to aggregate both within dimensions (i.e.,
how much does each individual count?), and across dimensions of val-
uation (i.e., howmuch does each value criteria count?). If value is by its
nature plural, then there are many possible ways of trading across di-
mensions of value. This plurality of value may not be able to be repre-
sented by a continuous utility function, in which case individuals
cannot be compensated for decrements in one dimension by improve-
ments in another (Holland, 2002a; D'Agostino, 2000; Sagoff, 1998;
Beckerman and Pasek, 1997; O'Neill, 1996). Take, for example, appraisal
of a hypothetical proposedminingproject. Dimensions of value could be
the usual costs and benefits (expected revenue, construction and oper-
ational costs, etc.), the livelihoods of people, the cultural impact of the
project, and impacts on local biodiversity. In conventional economic
analysis, if the benefits outweigh the costs after compensation, the pro-
ject would be ‘efficient’ and deliver a net value to society (even if these
compensations do not actually take place). However, CBA enforces a set
Table 4
Overview of deliberative and analytical-deliberative methods that can be used to assess shared values of ecosystems, their potential to address value commensurability and aggregation
issues, their suitability for different spatial scales and their relative requirements in terms of resources and timescales.Note: this table spreads horizontally across two pages.
Technique Description Types of values that may be elicited
Deliberative In-depth discussion
groups
Group (usually 4–8 people) discussions (often repeated),
during which participants shape the terms of discussion,
develop themes in ways relevant to their own needs and
prioritiesa
Process: Cultural/societal, communal, transcendental, group,
deliberated, other-regarding, values in relation to society
Outcome: Deliberated group or individual, transcendental
and/or contextual values
Citizen's juries A small cross section of the general public who come to a
considered judgement about a stated policy issue/problem
through detailed exposure to, and scrutiny of, the relevant
evidence base. Group responds by providing a
recommendation or ‘verdict’.a
Process: Cultural/societal, communal, transcendental,
deliberated, other-regarding, values in relation to society
Outcome: Deliberated group contextual values (verdict)
Deliberative opinion
polls
Technique designed to observe the evolution of the views of a
large citizen test group as they learn about a topic. Typically
the group votes on the issues before and after an extended
debate.a
Process: Cultural/societal, communal, transcendental, group,
deliberated, other-regarding, values in relation to society
Outcome: Deliberated individual indicators (vote counts)
Analytical–deliberative Participatory
modelling
The involvement of stakeholders in the design and content of
analytical models that represent ES and their benefits under
different spatial and temporal conditionsa
Process: Cultural/societal and communal contextual values.
Other-regarding and transcendental values only likely to be
made explicit if prompted through reflection/deliberation
process
Outcome: Deliberated group contextual values and indicators
(relative importance of different parameters and their
relationships)
Deliberative
monetary valuation
(DMV)
Techniques that use formal methods of group deliberation to
come to a decision on monetary values for environmental
change.a
May be allied to survey-based techniques (e.g., contingent
valuation, choice experiments) or use a non-econometric
approach to establish values (e.g., incorporating citizen's juries)
Process: Cultural/societal and communal contextual values.
Other-regarding and transcendental values only likely to be
made explicit if prompted through reflection/deliberation
process
Outcome: Deliberated and/or group indicators (deliberated
individual or group willingness-to-pay [WTP], deliberated
individual or group fair price, deliberated individual or group
social WTP)
Deliberative
multi-criteria
analysis
Techniques that involve groups of stakeholders designing
formal criteria against which to judge the non-monetary and
(sometimes) monetary costs and benefits of different
management options as the basis for making a decisiona
Process: Cultural/societal and communal contextual values.
Other-regarding and transcendental values only likely to be
made explicit if prompted through reflection/deliberation
process.
Outcome: Deliberated contextual individual or group values
and indicators (ratings/rankings/scores)
a Description adapted from Fish et al. (2011a).
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value can be both compared and compensated fully and justly
(Ravenscroft, 2010). Unless all parties completely agree about how dif-
ferent dimensions should be traded off against each other, it is not pos-
sible to draw out any single conclusion. The plurality of values is not just
a theoretical issue, but is also reflected in the wide range of motivations
that underlie willingness-to-pay in (contingent) valuation studies:
moral and political stances as well as expressions of welfare gains or
losses (e.g., Vadnjal and O'Connor, 1994; Clark et al., 2000; Desvousges
et al., 1993; Kenter et al., 2011).
There is no logically infallible way to aggregate utility across individ-
uals (Feldman, 1987). Arrow's (1950) impossibility theorem proved
that for anymethod of deriving social choices by aggregating individual
preference patterns, individual preference patterns can exist such that it
is impossible to derive a social ranking that meets certain minimal con-
ditions: consistency, non-dictatorship, universality, monotonicity, and
independence. As a consequence, social choice theory calls into question
whether aggregation of preferences across individuals in valuation and
CBA2 can lead to a single consistent ranking of policy alternatives (Parks
andGowdy, 2013). Economists have recognised the difficulties associat-
ed with establishing value to society through aggregation of individual
values (Baveye et al., in press), calling into question why many2 Note that this issue is not particular to economics; Arrow's impossibility theorem ap-
plies to any situation where a social preference is derived through aggregating individual
preferences.economists continue to uncritically employ aggregation methods that
have long been shown to be problematic (Parks and Gowdy, 2013).
5.1. Shared and social values and Total Economic Value
Thus, there are fundamental issues associated with establishing
value to society through arithmetically aggregating the plural values
of diverse individuals. Nonetheless, the questionmight arise of whether
shared and social values may be sufficiently addressed through assess-
ment of TEV. TEV includes ‘altruistic’ value (value of knowing that
something benefits other people alive now), ‘bequest’ value (value of
knowing that something benefits future generations), and ‘existence’
value (value of knowing that something benefits non-human life).
These value-components together make up ‘non-use’ value, which,
alongwith direct and indirect use value, completes the TEV framework.
If one interprets its non-use components as other-regarding, TEV can
be linked in variousways to the different types of shared values identified
in Section 3. First, bequest, existence and altruistic values may be seen as
various components of other-regarding values. Second, TEV-components
maybe underpinned by various transcendental values, such as justice and
fairness in relation to other people or other species, andharmonywith the
environment. Third, these valuesmay be associatedwith communal, soci-
etal and cultural values, stemming from or being strengthened by being
part of a community where these kinds of values are held in common.
Fourth, theymaybecomemore or less important or articulatedwhen elic-
ited through a deliberated process, and fifth, they may be expressed as a
group verdict, rather than as individual values.
Table 4
Overview of deliberative and analytical-deliberative methods that can be used to assess shared values of ecosystems, their potential to address value commensurability and aggregation
issues, their suitability for different spatial scales and their relative requirements in terms of resources and timescales.
Potential to address commensurability
and aggregation issues
Spatial scale Resources required Timescales
High — Deliberation process not restrictive of the type of
values that are expressed, though lack of structure can lead to
omission of latent/implicit values. Equitable means of
aggregation can itself be made a topic of deliberation.
Any, mostly used
locally/regionally
Low (local scale) to high (national scale) — In
contrast to some other deliberative methods there
is no set structure, thus process and outcomes are
uncertain and highly dependent on the quality of
facilitation.
Short to medium — Highly
flexible though dependent on
number of groups and
iterations
Medium to high — Deliberation structures are not restrictive
of the type of values that are expressed. Aggregation method
pre-determined
Any Low to medium — Quality depends on availability of
evidence and witnesses (which may drive up cost).
Medium — Depends on
complexity of issue, an
iterative approach may be
required.
Medium — Process may restrict the type of values that are
expressed. Aggregation method pre-determined
Any Medium to high — Mobilising large sample may
require considerable effort. Large-scale application
can be facilitated through digital resources.
Medium to long — Mobilising
large sample may require
considerable effort/time.
Low to medium — A highly structured process is likely to
restrict the type of values that are expressed unless additional
deliberate exercises are incorporated
Any, system bounds can
be established either
spatially or contextually.
Low to high, depending on complexity of model,
whether models are conceptual or also quantitative
and computer based. Complex processes require
elaborate facilitation.
Short to long — Depends on
complexity
Low to high — Strongly dependent on focus of deliberation
(economisation, moralisation or both), degree to which the
process restricts or inhibits elicitation of plural value types
and motivations, and degree to which value convergence is
enforced. Group-based decision-making and use of ‘fair price’
or social WTP as payment terms can address some of the
issues around aggregating individual preferences.
Any Econometric DMV requires the advanced
quantitative and survey design skills needed for
applying CV or CEs, plus facilitation skills. They also
require a substantial sample size. Large-scale DMV
can be costly though is potentially more efficient
for valuation of complex goods, than a conventional
individual interview approach.
Non-econometric approaches do not require
statistical expertise or large samples but do require
substantial facilitation and process design skills.
Econometric approaches:
medium to long — Depends on
sample size and complexity.
Non-econometric: short to
medium — Depends on
complexity
Low to high — Strongly dependent on focus of deliberation
(economisation, moralisation or both), degree to which the
process restricts or inhibits elicitation of plural value types
and motivations, and degree to which value convergence is
enforced.
Group-based outcomes can avoid issues around aggregating
individual preferences.
Any Low to medium — MCA processes can range from
simple to complex, and thus facilitation, design and
statistical expertise required varies. Sample size
requirements lower less than those of econometric
DMV
Short to medium — Depends
on complexity
94 J.O. Kenter et al. / Ecological Economics 111 (2015) 86–99In our experience, it is commonly perceived by both users and
producers of environmental valuation evidence that TEV is thus, to
some degree, able to incorporate shared and social values, particularly
other-regarding values, into economic analysis. Yet, economic con-
ceptualisations of altruistic, bequest and existence values are con-
ceived to only relate to the personal satisfaction (‘warm glow’) that
one gains from knowing that others might benefit from some envi-
ronmental good. If this were not the case, there would be a danger
of double counting, as satisfaction of an individual's preferences
may be counted by both that individual, and by others. There is
even some debate on whether the welfare associated with ‘warm
glow’ should be excluded from welfare measures and CBA
(Hausman, 1993; Nunes and Schokkaert, 2003). In practice, when
using economic monetary valuation methods, most types of shared
values (transcendental, societal, communal and other-regarding)
would be implicitly elicited within any TEV-based assessment; nei-
ther stated nor revealed preferences can avoid being influenced by
them. However, when using an individualistic monetary valuation
approach, it is likely that these values are both incompletely cap-
tured and poorly understood.
6. Deliberative and non-monetary assessment of shared and social
values
A wide range of other monetary and non-monetary techniques
exist that can elicit different types of shared and social values to
varying degrees, including deliberative monetary valuation,participatory multi-criteria analysis, citizen juries, deliberative fora
and polls, in-depth discussion groups, participatory modelling and
mapping, interpretive techniques such as media analysis, and psy-
chometric approaches (Tables 4–5). When attempting to establish
value to society in monetary terms, deliberative monetary valuation
can elicit a pre-aggregated, social willingness-to-pay (i.e., ‘how
much is this worth for society to pay for?’ or ‘how much should soci-
ety allocate to priority X as opposed to Y?’),which establishes a mea-
sure of social welfare through debate and negotiation rather than
aggregation of individual WTP. Such a process allows better incorpo-
ration of transcendental, other-regarding and cultural values in rela-
tion to the different components of TEV, as well as rights, duties and
virtues that are extrinsic to the TEV framework (Howarth and
Wilson, 2006), albeit on the condition that the process is consciously
designed and facilitated to mitigate potential social biases (Kenter
et al., 2014).
Participatory and deliberative processes are appealing in that they
provide participants of valuation studies with time to learn about the
good under investigation, as well as time to reflect upon (and construct
or potentiallymodify) their preferences (Christie et al., 2006;Macmillan
et al., 2002; Spash, 2007). Deliberative methods can also challenge the
assumption that values (particularly around complex goods, such as
biodiversity and ecosystem services) are pre-formed, indicating that
they need to be constructed through some kind of transformative
process of deliberation and learning (Christie et al., 2012; Kenter et al.,
2011, 2014; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Schlapfer, 2009; Spash, 2007,
2008). A group learning process is also important in respect to bringing
Table 5
Overview of interpretive-potentially deliberative, interpretive, psychometric–deliberative and psychometric methods that can be used to assess shared values of ecosystems, their
potential to address value commensurability and aggregation issues, their suitability for different spatial scales and their relative requirements in terms of resources and timescales. Note:
this table spreads horizontally across two pages.
Technique Description Types of values that may be elicited
Interpretive, potentially
deliberative
Participatory
mapping/GIS
A group of stakeholders consider or create a physical or
digital map to indicate landscape features that are
valuable (and/or problematic). Participants may also
rate or rank these features for importance. Map layers
can also incorporate photo, video, artwork, poetry, etc.
Process: Communal contextual values, if features are
important/assessed on a larger scale: contextual
cultural/societal values.
Outcome: As above. If features are deliberated and decided
upon or rated/ranked by groups, these take the form of
deliberated group contextual values and indicators.
Storytelling Participants are asked to tell stories about their
experiences of or in relation to places. These may be
reflected upon in a group setting to discuss values
related to these experiences.
Process: Communal contextual values, if features are
important/assessed on a larger scale: contextual
cultural/societal values. Other-regarding and transcendental
values only likely to be made explicit if prompted through
reflection/deliberation process.
Outcome: As process. If stories are deliberated in a group
setting, these may take the form of deliberated group values.
Number of times particular themes or values are expressed
can provide indicators.
Interviews Participants are interviewed about their values, beliefs
and preferences. Group interviews allow for
deliberation and are similar to in-depth discussion
groups. However, in group interviews, terms are set by
the interviewer rather than the group.
Process and outcome: As storytelling
Interpretive Media analysis Use of a range of textual analysis tools (particularly
content, frame and discourse analysis) on (mass)
media outputs and social media content over a selected
period of time
Process: n/a
Outcome: Transcendental, communal, societal and cultural
values, other-regarding-values
Desk-based cultural
history study
This approach can be used effectively as a first option
to quickly scan existing literature over a specified
period of time to identify values connected with the
decision being considered. The study can cover
academic and grey literature, as well as creative
writing (prose and poetry). Historical analysis can
deliver understanding of past value and belief conflicts
that can help to better manage present issues and
mitigate risks.
Process: n/a
Outcome: Transcendental, communal, cultural and societal
values, other-regarding-values
Other interpretive
methods
A wide range of qualitative techniques including
ethnography and participant observation, genealogy, life
history methods, dramaturgical analysis, reviewing
landscape character descriptions, other textual analysis
of various sorts including discourse, content and frame
analysis.
Process: N/A.
Outcome: Variable, can be particularly suited to
transcendental, communal, societal and cultural values.
Psychometric deliberative Value compass This method asks participants to consider which of
their individual transcendental values are most
important by ranking or rating them, and then asks to
discuss the degree to which these values are important
for one's community, culture or society. Values can also
be ranked or rated on a group basis. It is based on the
values typology developed by Schwartz (1990).
Process: Transcendental individual, communal, cultural
and/or societal values.
Outcome: As process, plus group and deliberated values
Psychometric Subjective well-being
indicators
These can be used to assess how and the degree to which
places contribute to one's well-being, and are thus highly
suitable for assessing the value of cultural ecosystem
services using a quantitative non-monetary metric.
Process: N/A
Outcome: Communal, societal and cultural contextual values
Other psychometric Psychometric testing refers to the measurement of
psychological phenomena and processes, e.g.,
knowledge, experience, attitudes, values, worldviews.
psychometric models (e.g., Values-beliefs-norms, theory
of planned behaviour) can be used to better understand
the impact of deliberative processes on values.
Process: N/A
Outcome: Standard scales exist for transcendental values, and
can be developed on a case-by-case basis for contextual
communal, cultural and social values. Statistical models can
be used to relate psychometric variables (e.g., transcendental
values) to contextual values and indicators such as WTP.
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and coming to well-considered decisions on group contextual values
and common preferences (Niemeyer, 2004). Such group values might
be expressed as a consensus or majority view on what the group be-
lieves to be in the best interest of society, although consensus views
are not always achievable or desirable (Sagoff, 1998). A deliberative
process could also result in the recognition of a diversity of values,
where outcomes are achieved that account for reasonable differences
(Lo, 2011, 2013).
Non-monetary, non-deliberative methods also have potential to ad-
dress various types of shared values. Interpretive and narrative-basedmethods can reveal communal and transcendental values,while the lat-
ter can also be assessed using psychometric survey-based methods and
interviews. Societal and cultural values at a larger scale can be assessed
through ethnographicmethods and textualmethods such asmedia con-
tent and discourse analysis.
As Tables 4–5 illustrate, particular methods relate to the different
types of shared values both in termsof outcomes of the process (contex-
tual values and indicators such as a deliberated group verdict, a group
ranking or deliberated group WTP) and in terms of values that arise
through the process. Different methods generate different types of
shared value outcomes and indicators, while both the method and
Table 5
Overview of interpretive-potentially deliberative, interpretive, psychometric–deliberative and psychometric methods that can be used to assess shared values of ecosystems, their poten-
tial to address value commensurability and aggregation issues, their suitability for different spatial scales and their relative requirements in terms of resources and timescales.
Potential to address commensurability and
aggregation issues
Spatial scale Resources required Timescales
High — Using group-based approaches, there is no
need to make features of value commensurable
across a single metric or aggregate them through an
arithmetic means.
Any, so far used mostly locally/regionally Low to medium — Depends on the
complexity of number of workshops needed
and the GIS. Resources needed increase with
scale.
Short to medium —
Increases with scale and
complexity
High — In interpretation/analysis, values are
generally treated as subjective and
incommensurable.
Any Low to medium — Depends on transcription
requirements and complexity of coding
Short to medium — Depends
on number of
individuals/groups
High — In interpretation/analysis, values are
generally treated as subjective and
incommensurable.
Any Low to medium — Depending on
transcription requirements and complexity
of coding
Short to medium —
Depending on number of
individuals/groups
High — Interpretive methods generally consider
that values are subjective and plural and cannot be
made commensurable in a single metric
Any Low to medium — Media analysis can be a
cost-effective and relatively rapid approach
for large-scale assessments for assessment of
societal and cultural values.
As media analysis Any Low to medium — Depending on depth of
investigation
Short to medium — Depends
on depth of investigation
Idem Variable Variable Ethnography: Long.
Others: Variable — Depends
on complexity and sample size
High — Different values are considered separately
and compared but not aggregated.
N/A Low Short
Low to high, different kinds of indicators can be
considered separately or averaged and aggregated
Any — highly suitable for large-scale
assessments, though there is a need for
standardised scales
Medium — Statistical expertise and sample
size requirements. Establishment of new
instruments is complex and time
consuming. Using existing validated, reliable
instruments can be relatively inexpensive
and rapid.
Short to medium — Depends
on complexity and sample
size
N/A Any As subjective well-being indicators As subjective well-being
indicators
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values that arise within the process, e.g., whether transcendental and
other-regarding values aremade explicit, which determines towhat de-
gree the outcomes of the process are ‘moralised’ and ‘democratised’ (c.f.
Lo and Spash, 2012). While most deliberative and non-monetary
methods are not bound to the problematic assumptions around value
commensurability and aggregation associated with conventional eco-
nomic methods (Tables 4–5), some analytical methods that use arith-
metic to aggregate across different dimensions of value (e.g., many
forms of multi-criteria analysis) contend with similar theoretical cri-
tiques (Raymond et al., 2014; Kenter, in press).7. Discussion
This paper has presented a theoretical framework for the consider-
ation of shared and social values, discussed the relationship between
shared and individual values, considered the limitations of neoclassical
economic valuation in assessing shared and social values, and briefly
discussed deliberative and interpretive alternatives. In general, the elic-
itation of shared and social values goes beyond the narrow elicitation of
individual monetary valuations to incorporate common notions of so-
cial goods and cultural importance through social processes that can in-
corporate a broad set of individual and shared meanings and concerns.
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shared and social values have been identified (Table 1) and the relation-
ship between individual and shared values conceived of as a dynamic
interplay, where values can be considered atmultiple levels (individual,
community, culture/society). While individuals represent and express
their culture, many transcendental societal values are implicit and re-
quire group deliberation to be fully brought to light. Hence assessment
of shared values can provide a more comprehensive account of value
than individual valuation alone.
One way in which the framework is particularly useful is for devel-
oping a clearer description of how deliberative processes impact on
values. So far the literature on deliberative valuation has distinguished
different processes, where preferences may be ‘economised’ by becom-
ingmore informed and robust through exchange of information and re-
flection in groups, ‘moralised’ through discussion of transcendental
values, or ‘democratised’ through Habermasian debate, developing in-
tersubjective, communicatively rational preferences (Lo and Spash,
2012; Lo, 2013). Our analysis can help to clarify how each of these pro-
cesses affects different types of values. For example, Lo (2013), describ-
ing a case study of small group deliberation on paying for climate
changemeasures, showed the process of democratisation presents pref-
erence convergence rather than value convergence: agreeing to pay
under value disagreement. This could, however, be interpreted by not-
ing that participants shared certain transcendental values (e.g., mutual
respect), which enabled a democratic process that focused on finding
agreement on contextual values and negotiating value-indicators.
Kenter et al. (2014) presented a deliberative contingent valuation and
a deliberative choice experiment case study as part of the follow-on
phase of the UK NEA. In both casesWTP decreased as a result of deliber-
ation sessions, which included explicit consideration of a wide range of
transcendental values by a UK wide sample of recreational users and a
local sample of community councillors respectively. Within the overall
decrease in willingness-to-pay, there was a shift away from prioritizing
options that were more associated with self-regarding values (in this
case, recreational benefits) towards prioritizing options that focused
on other-regarding values (species conservation) and value to society.
Econometric, psychometric and qualitative analysis of these delibera-
tions showed that participants were both ‘economised’ (e.g., about
what benefits really meant, how long they might last and who might
benefit most) and ‘moralised’ (e.g., balancing environmental versus
socio-economic priorities, duties to other species and generations, a col-
lective sense of responsibility for the environment and a felt shared de-
sire to ‘do your bit’). In a third UK NEA case study (a local group of
stakeholders considering the value of the marine environment using a
range of deliberative monetary and non-monetary methods) partici-
pants started out by identifying a very specific set of communal tran-
scendental values that then continued to provide a touchstone for
testing contextual values during democratic deliberative discussions
on management options (Kenter et al., 2014). Future research can ex-
plore in further detail howdifferent types of processes elicit or construct
different types of values, and how this might enhance the reflection of
subtle transcendental, cultural and communal values in contextual
values and value-indicators.
Although democratisation is by definition a social process,
economisation and moralisation do not just happen in groups, as indi-
viduals can also engage in deliberation in the sense of thinking and re-
flection. Asking people for altruistic, bequest, or existence values is, by
definition, a moral question, which is unlikely to receive a response in
terms of measure that reflects welfare alone (hence the debate about
whether statedWTP ismore of an indicator of attitudes than of welfare;
see Kahneman et al., 1999; Spash et al., 2009; Ryan and Spash, 2011).
When confronted with such questions, people will almost certainly
refer back to senses of duty or virtue, and this is likely to include taking
other people's values and norms into account as well as their own. Con-
ventional monetary valuation methods that purely focus on establish-
ing WTP may not capture the richness of value motivations that isprovided by transcripts of group discussion, but survey methods could
be enhanced by including psychometrics, open-ended motivational
questions, etc., or, on a smaller scale, by using individual interviews.
This way, and by including time to think to allow for individual deliber-
ation, it may be possible to elicit higher quality contextual values that
are a better reflection of underlying transcendental values, and to go be-
yond the ‘whims’ of poorly formed individual preferences.
Nonetheless, such an ‘individual deliberation’ approach to valuing
the environment misses out on one of the main advantages of group-
based deliberative approaches: the opportunity for social learning. De-
liberative learning processes, if well facilitated, allow the exchange of
information, considerations, perspectives, values, beliefs and norms,
which provides an opportunity to collectively wrestle with difficult
questions, particularly where there are risks, uncertainties, andwinners
and losers. Learning also becomes particularly importantwhen environ-
mental goods themselves are considered to have plural value dimen-
sions, with some components more subtle than others. An example is
the benefit of cultural identity formation and the way environmental
spaces and cultural goods enable a particular livelihood and way of
life, sense of place, aesthetics, and the social bonding that happens
around the active or passive use of spaces. These diverse values all
tend to be tied to a place, which is often intimately connected with a
sense of community around that place. Consequently, these place-
bound values are likely to be strongly shared as communal values. Ini-
tially, when valuing particular environmental attributes (regardless of
whether this is through monetary or non-monetary means), only the
more obvious (e.g., provisioning) services and benefitsmight be valued;
a social learning process may be required to bring out more subtle
shared senses of values with stronger moral and aesthetic components
(Kenter et al., 2011; Reed et al., 2013). Additionally, the limited research
available on the preferences for individual or group-based approaches
from valuation participants themselves seems to suggest that they feel
their values are more considered, and can be better expressed, after
group deliberation (Clark et al., 2000; Ryan and Spash, 2011; Kenter
et al., 2014).
Although a considerable literature exists on social and deliberative
learning processes, there is as yet little evidence on where, whether
and how group-based deliberative methods are able to elicit ‘better’
values beyond those gained from an improved individual survey ap-
proach to valuation, not just according to conventional instrumental
criteria (e.g., reduction of hypothetical bias), but also substantive
criteria. Research is thus needed to considerwhatmight be themost ap-
propriate protocols and techniques for legitimate deliberation, in order
to reduce the impact of problematic processes such as social-desirability
bias, and to know more about the impact of different ways of framing
and different approaches to instigate learning. If group learning strongly
influences values, it needs to be critically evaluated to what degree this
learning is endogenous to participants, and to what degree it is instigat-
ed by those that develop, frame, and facilitate the process.
Another important question is to consider when and where
decision-makers see shared value evidence as havingmore or less legit-
imacy than evidence based on the values of individuals.While there has
now been decades' worth of valuation evidence available, produced
with the explicit aim of policy-makers taking better account of environ-
mental benefits and costs, this has still not translated into tangible im-
provements in terms of environmental outcomes. Certainly, the belief
that, if we can only produce better andmore convincing value evidence,
this might change, is somewhat naïve (Jordan and Russel, 2014; Nutley
et al., 2007). There is a widely divergent view as to what ‘better’ values
and valuation might be, ranging from technical improvements and
eliminating instrumental and substantive biases to making values spa-
tially explicit, better informed, more considered or ‘deeper’ and more
representative. What is certainly clear is that decision-makers require
evidence to be contextualised as well as being of high quality (Church
and Ravenscroft, 2011). This suggests that, in addition to the quality of
evidence, decision-makers' ideas of ‘better’ are aligned to different
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and theusability of the evidence. These conceptualisations and concerns
will also vary across different decision-making venues and scales. For
example, whereas national or transnational institutions that monitor
ecosystem services may be interested in aggregate biophysical data,
quantitative indicators of well-being and monetary data, decision-
makers in a local policy consultation may be more interested in value
outcomes of a carefully designed process involving all relevant stake-
holders. This is not to say that national-scale indicators cannot be deliv-
ered through group-based valuation processes. For example, large-scale
deliberative monetary valuation, deliberative polls or citizens' juries
could generate successful forms of evidence, although there have been
few examples of this in practice.
However, shared and social values are not just about generating
more accurate, more complete or more legitimate evidence, but also
about recognising the importance of inclusiveness in decision-making.
The example of the UK government's forest privatisation (Section 4)
shows the power of collective values expressed as part of the public re-
sponse to the proposed policy. The public response revealed deeply held
shared cultural and communal values that had not been fully under-
stood and that did not show up in CBA. Utilising methods that elicit
such shared and social values as an integral part of policy development
could provide a greater understanding of the potential public response,
and help avoid inappropriate proposals and costly objections to non-
inclusive decisions. In potentially contentious issues such as major in-
frastructure projects, the siting of renewables or the designation of
protected areas, taking account of the things that people communally
or collectively value could also positively engender support. Under-
standing shared and social values through cross-community delibera-
tion can bring to the surface a richness of views that could inform
more beneficial, well-accepted decisions. In particular, understanding
which values are shared, and which are not, could help to allocate re-
sources to resolve points of conflict. For businesses, engaging in shared
value deliberations with stakeholders on how to implement new plans
or projects could also be an important aspect of risk management,
through enhancing buy-in and reducing conflict. Shared and social
values are also important for NGOs, particularly those who own large
tracts of land and have close connections to local communities and in-
terest groups. A better understanding of the shared and social values
that matter to these groups can help NGOs in managing their land and
communicating their key messages. Linking core objectives to shared
transcendental values can also increase the support that NGOs receive,
and strengthen their membership base.
Considerable further research is necessary in terms of building up a
credible evidence base for demonstrating the importance of shared
and social values in these different sectors and spheres, and in terms
of developing pluralistic methodologies for assessing the many and di-
verse shared and social values of nature. Such evidence-generation
should actively and directly involve decision maker to ensure that ap-
proaches, methods, and results are considered legitimate, relevant and
ultimately useable. This way, a more appropriate valuation of public
policy alternatives can be achieved, and the substantial collectivemean-
ings, significance and value of nature more effectively recognised and
safeguarded.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.01.006.
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